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Summary findings
The debate about the relationship between democratic  develops an analytical framework for a welfare cost-
forms of government and the free movement of capital  benefit analysis of financial openness to international
across borders dates to the 18th century. It has regained  capital flows.
prominence as capital on a massive scale has become  The main welfare benefits of financial openness derive
increasingly mobile and as free economies experience  from greater economic efficiency and increased
continuous pressure from rapidly changing technology,  opportunities for risk diversification. The welfare costs
market integration, changing consumer preferences, and  relate to the cost of insurance used as a mechanism for
intensified competition.  coping with the risks of financial volatility. These
These changes imply greater uncertainty about citizens'  insurance costs are the economic losses associated with
future income positions, which could prompt them to  redistribution,  including moral hazard, rent-seeking, and
seek insurance through the marketplace or through  rent-avoidance.
constitutionally arranged income redistribution.  A cross-sectional analysis of a large sample of
As more countries move toward democracy, the  developed and developing countries shows the positive
availability of such insurance mechanisms to citizens is  correlation between democracy (as defined by political
key if political pressure for capital controls is to be  and civil liberty) and financial openness.
averted and if public support for an open, liberal  More rigorous econometric  investigation using logit
international financial order is to be maintained.  analysis and controlling for level of income also shows
Dailami briefly reviews how today's international  that redistributive social policies are key in determining
financial system evolved from one of mostly closed  the likelihood that countries can successfully  combine an
capital accounts immediately after World War II to  openness to international capital mobility with
today's enormous, largely free-flowing market.  democratic forms of government.
Drawing on insights from the literature on public
choice and constitutional  political economy, Dailami
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I.  Introduction
The observation  that all advanced democratic countries are also open to free capital mobility
across their national borders invites renewed debate on the link between democracy  and financial
openness. This debate  has a long and distinguished  history that goes back to the 18t century,  but
it has gained prominence  recently  as capital has become increasingly  mobile at a massive scale,
and as free economies  have come under continuous  pressure from rapidly changing technology,
market integration,  changing  consumer  preferences, and intensified  competition.  Reflecting  the
influence  of advances  in communication  and information  technologies,  financial innovations,
and deliberate  government  policies to abolish  barriers and controls on capital mobility,
international  financial markets have grown significantly  in recent years. The volume in
international  lending in new medium and long-term bonds and bank loans reached $1.2 trillion in
1997, up from $0.5 in 1988 (BIS 1998).  International  financial  transactions now dwarf world
trade at more than five times the value of world GDP. The average daily turnover in foreign
exchange markets  reached $1.6 trillion in 1995 (up from $0.2 trillion in 1986),  compared with
the $6.7 trillion a year in trade in goods and services. 2
While free capital mobility has its antecedents  in 17th and 18t century Europe,  the
worldwide  triumphant  spread of democracy  as a desirable system of governance  is a fairly recent
phenomenon  bolstered by several  developments,  including  the rise of global civil society and the
information  age, and the collapse of state socialism.  This expansion  of democracy,  coupled with
the corresponding  increase in political and civil liberty,  means that for the first time in human
history, electoral  democracy  is the world's predominant  form of governnent, which represents
an historic victory over alternative  forms of government  (Held, 1995). A recent survey
conducted by the Freedom House found that 88 of the world's 191 countries (46 percent) - the
largest number  ever recorded - were rated as free, meaning that "they,  maintain a high degree of
political and economic  freedom and respect for civil liberties." 3
What explains  the spread of both democracy  and financial openness  at this juncture of
history, given  the constraining  impact  of financial  market integration  on national policy
autonomy?  To be sure, both the goals of a democratic  polity and free capital mobility command
I  This  paper  was largely  inspired  by the author's  earlier  contributions  to The Qudity  of Grwth, a research  project  led by Vinod Thomas
of the  World  Bank  Institute.  In this work,  contributors  seek  to propagate  a broader  conception  of economic  growth,  embracing
environmnental  sustainability,  governance,  financial  stabiliy,  and  human  capital  as  the fundamental  ingredients  of quality  growth  and
poverty  alleviation.  In this  paper,  we  examine  in greater  detail  the link  between  financial  openness  and  democracy  as  two  important
aspects  of the evolving  global  govemance  structure.
2 The  figure  reflects  the average  of world  imports  and  exports  of goods  and  services  in 1988  (WDI  2000).
3 Democratically  elected  govemrnments  govem  a majority  of the world's  population.  As noted  above,  2.354  billion  people  (40  percent
of the  world's  population)  now  live  in free  societies,  1.57  billion  (26.5  percent)  live  in  countries  that  are  partially  free  and 1.984  billion
(33.5  percent)  live  in  non-free  countries.  (Karatnycky,  1999).
1a high degree of respect today arnong international  relations scholars and policy-makers.  These
goals are commonly viewed as an important ingredient  of "liberal democracy."  Yet, the practical
importance of the liberal component  of liberal democracy,  when viewed against the backdrop  of
post-war history, has not been in accord with the tenets of the classical liberal order. Rather, it is
more akin to the "embedded liberalism"  of the Bretton Woods era, which was composed  of a
liberal international  order in trade and investment  with Keynesian-welfare  economics  on the
domestic side. Greatly influenced  by the trials of the Great Depression  and the Second World
War, the architects  of the Bretton Woods system favored  the use of capital controls  by national
governments  as a tool for preserving  national macro-economic  policy control, and as a means for
defending stable exchange  rates and the liberal international  trade order. The commitment  to
protective economic security,  which was embedded in this model and provided  through a
mixture of aggregate  demand management,  redistributive  taxation, and regulation,  served the
cause of democracy  well in combating  the threats from fascism  and communism.  At the same
time, multilateralism  in trade and investment  on the external  side contributed  to the domestic
growth and prosperity  upon which policies of income redistribution  could be built and
maintained.
The collapse of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates in the early 1970s,  the
rise in oil prices, chronic inflation and slumping  global economic  conditions,  led to a
fundamental  reappraisal  of this policy mix as well as the whole edifice of the political economy
of the welfare state. Not least, the redistributive  logic of the welfare state came under attack  from
the forces of globalization  of finance, bringing  home the realization  that with capital  mobility
and flexible  exchange rates, a national government's autonomy in undertaking counter-cyclical
macro policy is limited, as France experienced  under the socialist govermnent in the early 1980s
(McCarthy,  1990).  The resurgence of neo-liberalism  in the 1980s and 90s, with its emphasis  on
free capital mobility and a more orthodox fiscal and monetary  policy, and the literature related to
public choice and constitutional  political economy  raised serious questions about the cost-benefit
calculus of consent for redistribution  in a democratic  society, as well as the economic  costs and
the propensity  for rent seeking  behavior.
The institutional  solution  that is now emerging contains two clearly  identifiable  trends:
first a thrust toward the expansion  of the marketplace  to areas that were previously  under the
control of the state, such as the provision of infrastructure  services,  as well as critical social
services  such as health and education.  Secondly,  there is a growing sense and recognition  that
questions of justice and poverty  alleviation  are of universal concern and central to the debate on
the evolution of the world economy and the sustainability  of the global democratic order. The
first trend is grounded in the economic  logic of efficiency  and the better distribution  of risk that
the private provision of social services  seeks to deliver. 4 The latter derives its legitimacy  from
the international  redistributive  justice doctrine, and a related concern for the social dimensions  of
the globalization  process. 5 6 Thus, the centrality of poverty  reduction in the contemporary
4  See  Dailami  and  Klein (1998)
5 See  Bohman (1999),  Beitz  (1999a,  1999b),  Thomas (2000),  Sen (1999),  Kapstein  (1999)  and CEPR (1998)
6 At present,  there  are approximately  3 billion  people  living  under  $2  a day,  widt  about 1.3  billion  living  on less  than $1  a day.  This
point  is  well-explored  in 7h Q  4alty  of  CGmnv,  edited  by  Vinod  Thomas.
2development  debate has defined a new mandate for international  financial  organizations,  as
articulated  most forcefully by James Wolfensohn:
"At the center of the issue is poverty; at the center is equity, because whatever
be the governments  and whatever be the framework,  if you have a
preponderance  of poor people, if you have inequity, you are going to have not
only social injustice  by definition,  but you will have instability.  This is
something  which is increasingly  and appropriately  recognized  and not just as
an issue of moral and social conscience  in terms of dealing with the question
of poverty. It is an issue of good politics. It is an issue of stability and peace." 7
With these trends in perspective,  how attainable  are the twin goals of democracy  and
financial  openness for developing countries?  For these countries,  democratic aspirations  and
ideals have been on the rise in recent years, and yet their integration  into global international
capital markets  has been difficult, fraught  with risk, and associated  with cycles of severe and
costly currency,  financial and sovereign  debt crises, as demonstrated  by recent financial crises. 8
Experience  over the past two decades  has been telling: the loss in aggregate  domestic output  in
1997-99  in affected  East Asian countries,  measured by the deviation from trends, is estimated  to
be $500 billion (in 1996 prices and exchange rates), nearly 1.3 times those countries' external
debt in 1996 (Dailami,  2000). Latin America lost a decade of economic growth following  the
debt crisis of the early 1980s, and the international  financial community  has extended a large
sum of financial  assistance  through multilateral and bilateral rescue loans to crisis-affected
countries  in the 1  990s.
The high social and economic  costs associated  with financial instability are unacceptable,
and provide a strong case for financial  innovation and devising  better approaches  to avoid
financial  crises in the future and to reduce their severity when they occur. Strengthening
domestic  regulation and supervision of banks and other intermediaries, rebuilding the
information  infrastructure  of financial  markets, including accounting  norms, and improving
corporate governance  constitute  the necessary  first steps, as has been widely reported in both
academic and policy circles. But these will not be sufficient  unless they are reinforced by actions
to maintain  public support for open capital markets. Securing  public support for financial
openness  in democratic countries  will require the availability  of mechanisms  through which
insurance  is provided  to citizens, either through the marketplace  or through redistributive  policy
in the form of public expenditures  on education,  health, and transfer  payments. As with other
public goods,  public support could suffer from the under-investment  problem, meaning that its
adequate  provision would require addressing  the associated  agency, moral hazard, and incentive
issues.
7 "Development  Choices  in a Changing  World,' Speech  made to the American  Philosophical  Sodety, Philadelphia,  Nov. 11, 1999
8 In 1997-1998,  a combination of tight liquidity in international capital markets along with austere domestic macroeconomic
policy responses led to deep economic and financial crises, which were unprecedented in several important respects, including
the extent of the initial depreciation of local currencies,  the plunges in asset values on local equity and bond markets, the severe
financial distress in finance and industry,  and the contraction  of economic  activity.
3This article proceeds in three sections. The following section proceeds  with a brief
narrative of how today's international financial system evolved from one of mostly closed capital
movements immediately following the Second World War to the enormous, largely free-flowing
market that it is today. The paper will draw on insights from the literature on public choice and
constitutional  political economy to argue how the logic of economic exit and political voice
affects countries' policy choices, both domestically and internationally.  Two factors figure
prominently:  international  policy coordination  on macroeconomic  and regulatory policies; and
redistributive  policy (health, education, and transfer payments). In this context, the third section
begins with a quantitative  measurement  of financial openness  to cross-border  capital flows and
democracy,  and proceeds with some cross-country  econometric investigation  on the link between
financial openness  and democracy.  The econometric results, which are based on simple
correlation and more rigorous logit analysis, provide strength  to the argument that redistributive
social policies are key in determining  the likelihood  of countries successfully  combining an
openness to international  capital mobility and democratic  forms of government.  The fourth
section concludes  the paper.
II. Historical  Antecedents
Embedded Liberalism and The Bretton Woods Era
The relationship  between financial openness and democracy  appears at first sight to be
primarily  a function of the level of income, and more precisely, per capita income: rich countries
are, with few exceptions, democratic in government,  either presidential or parliamentary  in type.
Rich countries are also open to international  capital movement,  as they have a high degree of
financial sector development,  currency convertibility  on capital accounts, and enjoy
macroeconomic  stability, domestic rule of law, and stable institutions that guarantee  civil and
political liberty. At a deeper level of analysis, the link between democracy  and financial
openness proves to be complex and subject to historical tradition.
For the classical liberal economist,  the rise of movable capital in the 1  7th and 1  8h centuries
in Europe was seen in a favorable light.  As recounted  by Hirschman,  "...the  fact that, with the
bill of exchange, a large portion of wealth had become mobile and elusive and was capable of
both hiding and expatriation is celebrated  as a restraint on the grand coups d 'autorite of the
prince and as a positive contribution  to good government...."9  This classical liberal ideal,
however, broke down in the 1930s  with the Great Depression and the Second World War.
The post-World War II institutional  reconstruction,  which created the Bretton Woods
system of monetary and exchange rate arrangements, was grounded in the compromise  of
9 The fears and hopes aroused by the rise of movable capital in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries offer many interesting
parallels with similarly contradictory  perceptions caused quite recently by the rise of the multinational corporation.  One could
substitute the term "globalization  of finance" for "multinational  corporation" and make this observation even more relevant to
today's world.
4"embedded liberalism".'I This compromise involved an openness to international  arrangements
focusing on trade, exchange rates, and investment,  combined with national autonomy and
discretion in macroeconomic  policy and capital flow controls (provided that such controls were
not intended to restrict trade). With the Bretton Woods Agreement, capital controls became an
accepted  norm of the prevailing international  monetary system. Indeed,  not even the IMF was
granted  jurisdiction over capital movements. Reflecting  the understanding  of the time, John
Maynard Keynes expressed the issue succinctly  in his oft-quoted speech to Parliament, stating
that: "Not merely as a feature of the transition, but as a permanent  arrangement, the plan accords
to every member government the explicit right to control all capital movements. What used to be
heresy is now orthodox... It follows that our right to control the domestic capital market is
secured  on firmer foundations  than ever before, and is formally accepted as a part of agreed
international  agreements." The relative closure of national economies  - with a few exceptions -
to the free flow of capital in this era afforded governments  the scope for deploying the
instruments  of fiscal and monetary policy, including progressive  taxation and public
expenditures,  in pursuit of national objectives such as full employment  and social equity, without
fear of the exit of capital. The analytical underpinning  of Bretton Woods was the classical open
economy models  of Mundell and Fleming, according to which countries can attain only two of
the following  three conditions: capital mobility, fixed exchange rates, and monetary policy
autonomy.  At the same time, fixed exchange rates facilitated the process of trade liberalization  in
OECD countries,  which was critical for the expansion  of world trade and output.
According  to John Ruggie,  the essence of this liberal order - distinct from the classical
liberalism  of the gold standard  - was multilateralism  in trade and related exchange arrangements
on the external side, combined with unilateral state interventionism  in pursuit of legitimate
national goals (full employment,  national security, and social stability)  on the domestic side. This
policy mix, reflecting  the preeminence of the "embedded liberal" framework of the time,
accepted the use of capital controls in Western Europe and Japan in the early post-war era, with
the US taking an accommodating  and even sympathetic stance. Vital to the "compromise of
embedded  liberalism", as emphasized  by Sally (1998), is an international  focus on creating a
network of inter-governmental  institutions that promote international  cooperation  and stabilize
social contracts, and a domestic focus on cushioning  and spreading  the costs of adjusting  to the
measures  of international  liberalism.
By combining  fixed exchange rates with capital controls on the external side, and
Keynesian  welfare state macroeconomics  on the domestic side, the Bretton Woods system
yielded a stable basis for economic  growth and trade expansion.  As history attests, this policy
mix proved highly successful in at least four key areas: (i) reducing the barriers to trade, which
led to a rapid expansion  in world trade; (ii) facilitating the move toward the free flow of capital
and full capital account convertibility  in the major industrial countries; (iii) accommodating  the
external  financing needs of developing countries in the context of their growing economies and
increasing  integration into the world economy; and (iv) consolidating  the move toward
I0Coined  by  John Ruggie  (1983),  this term connotes  a commitment  to a liberal  order different  from both the economic  nationalism  of
the 1930s  and  the liberalism  of the gold  standard.  For further  elaboration,  see  G. Garrett  (1998).  R. Sally  (1998)  also  referred  to
embedded  liberalism  as "mixed  system  thinking,  or "Smith  abroad  and  Keynes  at home".
5democratic governance and political liberty, initially in Western Europe and as of late,
worldwide.
The collapse of the Bretton Woods system, the subsequent floating of exchange rates, the
rise in oil prices, chronic inflation, and slumping global economic conditions led to intensified
currency and interest rate risks in global financial markets during the 1970s  and 1980s.  These
risks instigated  responses that were principally "market solution"'" oriented, exemplified by the
drive toward the international  diversification of capital, and the impressive expansion of
derivitive markets (i.e. interest and currency forwards, options and swaps). These steps occurred
in tandem with an important shift in the direction of macroeconomic  policy away from its
traditional focus on full employment and toward price stability. The success of these actions has
been considerable  on both fronts - derivative markets today provide a broad a range of hedging
instruments for managing currency and interest rate risks in major currencies. The total market
value of currency and interest rate futures, options, and swaps traded both on exchanges and over
the counter was estimated at the end of 1997  to have reached over US$40 trillion, which is
considerably larger than the market capitalization  value of world stock markets.
On the macroeconomic  front, industrial countries as well as many developing countries
experienced considerable  success in attaining stability, with reductions in fiscal deficits and the
lowering of inflation and interest rates. Indeed, cross-country empirical research shows that
volatility in the main macroeconomic  variables, i.e. growth, export and inflation rates (measured
by their standard  deviation in a sample of 90 developing countries), in the 1990s  declined by
more than 60 percent as compared with the 1980s.
Today, the implementation  of measures ensuring financial openness among OECD
countries is nearly complete. Progress towards liberalization of capital controls accelerated,
particularly in the 1980s,  as members' liberalization obligations under The Code of
Liberalization  of Capital Movements  were broadened  to include virtually all capital movements
including short-term  transactions by enterprises and individuals.' 2 Thus, the U.K. abolished all
exchange controls and achieved capital account convertibility  in 1979. Japan completed this in
1980,  while the timeline for the rest of the OECD stretched until 1992, when the last group-
comprising  Ireland, Greece, Portugal, and Spain-completed the abolition of their capital
controls. By the early 1990s,  the capital accounts of OECD countries were open to a wide range
of cross-border  financial transactions including capital market securities, money market
operations,  forward operations, swaps, and other derivatives. This process of liberalization
coupled with the internationalization  of financial  markets means that today in OECD countries
borrowers can raise financing in their desired currency at competitive  terns, and investors have
the opportunity  to achieve  their desired degree of portfolio diversification in terms of currencies,
maturities and risk profile.
Regarding emerging market economies,  the overall trends have also been towards the
reform of local financial markets and the liberalization  of cross-border  capital movements,  but
"See  Dailami,  Mansoor,  'Managing  Risks  of Capital  Mobility,"  PoicyResmot  WokgPaper 2199,  World  Bank Institute, 1999.
12 See  OECD (1990)
6the progress, the pace, and the scale of liberalization measures has not been even. Domestic
reforms in the developing world that have contributed  to financial  globalization include the
privatization  of public enterprises,  macroeconomic  stabilization,  and the relaxation of barriers  to
cross-border trade in financial instruments for both sovereign and private entities, which in turn
improved country  creditworthiness  and expanded investment  opportunities. The underlying
liberalization  trends have been most clear with regard to the rapid increase in the number of
countries that have assumed IMF Article VIII, thereby declaring  their currencies convertible on
current accounts,  which often precedes  capital account convertibility. In 1970 only 34 countries,
or 30 percent of the IMF membership, had declared  their currency  convertible on current account
transactions. By 1997, 143 countries had done so (see Figure 1). In the 1990s  alone, 38
countries, including India, Russia, Turkey, Israel, Greece, and the Philippines assumed IMF
Article VIII (a complete list of countries  having assumed Article VIII, with date of assumption,
is given in the Annex). With regard to the liberalization of capital controls in emerging market
economies,  two sets of indicators are of interest: First, actual flows of capital have witnessed a
significant expansion  in the 1  990s, with sharp drops in 1997  and 1998, and recovering once
again in 1999. Second,  the deliberate policies of national governments  in the 1990s clearly
reflect a considerable  degree of easing of exchange restrictions, controls, and barriers to the entry
of foreign financial players engaging in conmmercial  banking, securities, asset management, and
other financial services.
More  countries  open  their  cvrrent  account
Figure 1:
IMF member countries  with convertible  currencies  on current  accounts
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7The Neo-Liberal  Perspective
The ascendancy of a neo-liberal order in the 1980s and 90s, consisting  of free capital
mobility, orthodox fiscal and monetary policy, and market-oriented  economic management,  has
brought into sharp focus the tension between democratic concerns for protective economic
security and the globalization  of finance. With the free mobility of capital, monetary policy is
ineffective under a regime of fixed exchange rates, and fiscal policy is ineffective under a
flexible exchange rate regime. Thus, under either exchange rate regime, a national government's
autonomy in choosing and managing macroeconomic  policy is restricted. Yet, concern regarding
the effect of free capital mobility on democratic order transcends  the ambit of macroeconomic
management and relates more fundamentally  to a broader range of issues, referred to in the
literature as the "democratic deficit;" that is, how can democratically  elected national
governments  provide the necessary compensatory mechanisms  that could underwrite social
stability and democracy within a globalized financial environment.  The question has defined the
pivotal point around which the debate on the resurgence of neo-liberalism  has centered.
Within a strict interpretation  of contemporary  neo-liberalism,  priority is assigned to the
maximum possible freedom for goods, capital, and investment  to move across national borders.
This freedom is regarded as the source of economic  prosperity, aggregate welfare gains, and
wealth and income creation. Thus, from this vantage point, the redistribution  logic of the welfare
state, which was so critical for the consolidation  of democracy  in the post-war era, contradicts
with the neo-liberal conception  of a minimalist state within the current nation-state  international
relations paradigm. In other words: "The urge for free markets and small governments  has
created asymmetries  in the relationship between the global economy and the national state that
have undermined the post-Second War embedded liberal compromise.""(Devetak  and Higgot,
1999).
The economic  benefits of financial openness are both well-articulated  and well-known.
Thus, it is generally  agreed that open capital accounts bring many economic benefits to both
individual countries  and the global economy as a whole. Major benefits for developing countries
include access to a broader menu of investment sources, options and instruments, enhanced
efficiency of domestic financial institutions, and the disciplinary  impact of capital markets in
conducting domestic macroeconomic  policy. Additionally,  by easing financing constraints,  the
greater availability  of international  finance can extend the'time period over which countries can
implement needed adjustments.1 3 For creditor countries, open capital markets can mean broader
investment  and risk diversification  opportunities, particularly as their aging populations and
growing pension funds seek higher and safer returns on their investments.  From the viewpoint of
the global economy,  open capital accounts support the multilateral trading system, expanding  the
opportunities for portfolio diversification  and the efficient allocation of global savings and
investment (see Fischer, 1998).
13 Markets  will be wiling to provide this leeway,  however,  only if they perceive  that countries  are truly undertaking  adjustments  that
fundamentally  address  existing  and  prospective  imbalances.  Otherwise,  markets  will  eventually  exert  their own  discipline,  in such  a
way  that  the time  period  for  adjustment  may  be brutally  shortened  (see  Dailami  and  Haque,  1998).
8This account of the benefits of financial openness also needs to be extended to include a
libertarian view emphasizing  the freedom of choice and individual liberty that financial openness
offers to citizens  seeking to invest income and wealth and borrow internationally.  This suggests
that there is also an important property rights issue involved. As Richard Cooper states,
"individuals should be free to dispose of their income and wealth as they see fit, provided their
doing so does not harrn others."''  This view has gained prominence in the recent dialogue and
narrative of international  financial relations. The importance  of this liberal paradigm in building
a new international  financial architecture has also been emphasized  by policymakers.  According
to Lawrence Summers,  U.S. Secretary of the Treasury: "We should all be able to agree on the
danger of ..  .denying a country's own citizens the capacity to convert their own currency and
invest abroad. Such measures represent substantial intrusions on freedom." 15  This view assigns
particular  importance to the goals of openness  to international capital movements and democratic
governance.  These goals command respect today among scholars and policymakers  concerned
with international  finance and the underlying empirical evidence is compelling.  The spread of
democracy  and civil liberty means that for the first time in human.history,  electoral democracy is
the world's predominant  form of government.  Furthermore,  cross-sectional evidence reveals a
robust association  between financial openness and political and civil liberty. It can thus be
argued that countries more open to international  capital flows are also more open to offering
political rights and civil liberties to their citizens.
There is a concern, however, that the globalization  of finance may tend to undermine
democratic forms of governance. This conflict between democracy  and financial openness is
seen to arise from the constraints that globalization  in general and the globalization  of finance in
particular impose on the ability of national governments  to deploy redistributive  taxation,
regulation, and risk-sharing. The consolidation  of the move towards democratic governance, in
turn, means increased demand by citizens  for a political voice, for national economic security,
and for social insurance against heightened  exposure to international  financial volatility. For
policymakers  in democratic societies, the globalization  of finance has brought to the fore the
classic challenge  - in Hirschman's terminology  -of how to balance the threat of exit of capital
with the political demands for voice, and the increased political incentives  for further
goverrnment  intervention in cushioning  market dislocation. This challenge is greatest for many
developing countries  with nascent democratic institutions. As recent events in Russia, Brazil and
East Asia have demonstrated,  the integration of financial markets has increased the potential
threat of capital flight and economic insecurity,  bolstering the argument that the risks of closer
financial integration  might be too high.  Such risks include a vulnerability to sudden reversals of
capital flows,  dramatic  jumps in the cost of capital, and loss of national policy autonomy.
Shifts in investors' sentiment  and beliefs, as reflected in a sharp turnaround in capital flows
and/or a spike in emerging market economies' borrowing costs, can be caused by coordination
failures on the part of creditors. This coordination  problem could happen because of incomplete
information  between creditors that could render their decision to run or flee from a particular
country dependent  on the behavior of others. This dependence  can generate  a run, analogous  to a
14  Cooper, p. 12 (1998)
'5 Speech  delivered  October 22, 1998,  Washington,  D.C., Cato Institute's 16th  Annual  Monetary  Conference.
9"bank run" in domestic settings, adding a non-cooperation  premium on top of other country risk
premia.  1 6 Thus, it is increasingly being argued  that under some circumstances,  i.e., weakness in
local financial markets, euphoria and panic behavior of foreign investors, and structural balance
of payments problems,  there exists a case for deploying capital controls, particularly  on short-
term flows, to reduce volatility. In this respect, Chile's capital controls experience has attracted
considerable interest, partly because of its market-based  nature, transparency, and the fact that it
is easier to phase out restrictions based on taxation than those on quantitative controls.' 7
Indeed, the social costs associated with the recent crises in emerging market economies
have been substantial. According  to a recent study by Stiglitz and Bhattacharya (1999),
unemployment doubled in Thailand and tripled in Korea over the course of a year during the
recent crises, while standards of living declined 14% and 22%, respectively; Indonesia also
experienced a 25% decrease in standard of living. Not quantifiable are further costs such as lost
schooling, malnutrition  among some, and political strife. 18 In the face of these apparent
constraints, then, what accounts for the fact that virtually all modern advanced democracies are
today also open to international  capital movements and indeed, by the early 1  990s had all
achieved capital account convertibility  on their currencies? 19 It will be argued below that there
are two dimensions  to this explanation: on the domestic side, redistribution;  and on the
international side, policy and regulatory coordination.  In other words, since global financial risks
have both macroeconomic  and distributional consequences,  the appropriate policy responses
would entail both macroeconomic  and social policy responses,  i.e. redistributive measures such
as transfer payments and higher public expenditures on areas such as health and education.  At
the same time, since financial liberalization implies global welfare gains, there exists a rationale
for international  financial assistance, or in other words, insurance at the global level.
Redistribution  As Income Insurance
The most relevant aspect of redistribution  that is germane to the debate on the link between
democracy  and the globalization  of finance is its recent articulation  within the scope of
constitutional  political economy {Kliemt  (1993); Wessels (1993); and Buchanan, Tullock
(1  962)}. In contrast to much of traditional Pareto welfare economics, which focuses on aggregate
welfare and thus has little to contribute  to the theory of redistribution,  the literature on
constitutional political economy explicitly incorporates a consideration  of institutions and the
public choice process  though which income redistribution  can be implemented  in a democratic
society. Thus, the question of why citizens in a democratic society consent to an involuntary
redistribution  scheme has generated  two sets of justifications: First, is the idea that redistribution
16 See  Haldane (1999)  for further elaboration  of this point.
17 For  further analysis,  see Sebastian  Edwards (1998), Gai  Flo,  Real Ex&,W  Rates,  and Capita Con&l  Sone Latin Ametrca
Expeins.  Working  Paper from National Bureau  of Economic Research,  Inc. and Leonardo Hemandez and Klaus  Schmidt-Hebbel
(1999),  Capitl Cls  in Gile  Efftize? Eff:ici? Enduable?  Paper Presented at the World Bank conference on Capital Flows,
Financial  Crisis  and Policies,  April 15-16,  1999.
18 For further discussion  of the poverty implications  of financial  instabiltiy  see Dailami  (2000).
19 See  Goodman and  Pauly (1993)
10can be seen as income insurance; that is, so far as citizens are risk averse, they may be willing to
give up part of their income today to obtain protection  against the risk of becoming poor in the
future (Olson, 1987; Wagner, 1986; and Wessels, 1993).  This approach draws on the theory of
insurance and risk aversion to propel the use of income insurance  as a basis for redistribution.
Secondly, income redistribution  policies are deemed necessary  to reduce market inequality and
thus promote social stability and cohesion.
The motivation for redistribution  as income insurance - distinct from altruism and other
poverty reduction related motives 20 -is induced by volatility and insecurity in underlying
economic  conditions and when citizens are risk-averse.21  In a world with a high degree of capital
mobility across national borders, a dilemma facing open democratic societies is how to balance
the threat of exit of capital, made more credible by the opening  of capital markets, with the
political demands for voice, and increased political incentives  for government intervention in
cushioning  market dislocation. The basic argument can be elaborated more clearly in
Hirschman's terminology of exit and voice. Financial market integration has increased the exit
potential of capital, as investors' ability to shift their financial resources to other countries has
increased by virtue of the openness of capital markets. The threat of exit of capital, in this sense,
refers not only to investors' decisions  regarding existing foreign assets that can be liquidated or
unwinded, but also to domestic liquid assets, such as money, and other liquid assets that can be
converted and transferred. 22
Financial  market integration has also heightened the sense of economic insecurity and risk
among a broader section of society. Investors dissatisfied  with the host countries' policies or
prevailing  investment  climate find it easier to shift their financial  resources to other countries and
regions, with a subsequent disproportionate  distribution of costs borne by less-mobile factors of
production  - i.e. labor, agriculture.  The political dimension,  consequently, becomes important.
The counterbalance  to the threat of exit of capital is the political voice of citizens, demanding
protection against external risks through redistribution, social safety net programs, and other
insurance-like  measures. In the absence of a market for risks, rational citizens will structure  non-
market institutions  to reduce the welfare losses incurred from volatility in economic conditions.
Thus, in this interpretation  voice belongs to the political sphere, and how it is exercised is a
function of the underlying political institutions and, in particular, the degree of political and civil
liberty. We argue that the higher the degree of democracy,  the greater the need to balance the
threat of capital flight, which is more likely with the opening of capital markets, with political
demands, which include the need political incentives  for increasing government intervention  in
cushioning market dislocation.  Indeed, critical for easing  the tension between politics and
financial openness in OECD countries,  has been the role of their redistributive  policies in
20 See Wessels  (1993)  for a justification  of this type of redistributive  scheme,  within  the realm of methodological  individualism.
21 The idea of distribution as insurance has, of course, a long tradition in welfare economnics  going back to Lemer (1994);  Hasaryi
(1953),and  Rawls (1971). More recently  this issue has been analyzed  from the perspective  of constitutional  political economy,  see
Mueller (1997);  Wessels  (1993).
22 The exercise  of exit of capital  can be seen as a function of the degree of the 'liquidity"  of the underlying  assets -the more liquid  the
assets,  the less transaction costs involved  - and the degree of financial  openness  of the countty. For fixed assets, such as investments
in plants and equipment  with high sunk-in  costs,  the transaction  cost for liquidating  an investment  is much higher.
11mitigating and redistributing risk, through massive  transfer payments and other insurance-type
government involvement. In recent years (1991-97), government  expenditures in high income
OECD countries on health, education,  social security, and welfare have averaged about 25
percent of GDP, with smaller open European countries such as Norway, Denmark, and Sweden,
spending as much as 30% of their GDP. 3
Arguments about the link between redistribution  and financial openness can also be
anchored in the median voter model with risk aversion (Bishop, Formby, and Smith, 1991). The
median voter model has been used the literature on the politics of income redistribution  as a
framework  for analyzing political choice. Thus, in its simplest form, the median voter model
predicts that in a democratic system, the median voter will use the ballot box to facilitate self-
interested  redistribution.  Citizens face a trade-off between the costs and benefits of income
redistribution. The main benefits consist of a reduction in the variance of future levels of
income; and the costs are the deadweight costs associated with government  intervention, as well
as the fiscal costs associated with financing such redistributive  schemes. Any involuntary
redistribution  - i.e. not motivated by altruism - is bound to entail deadweight economic costs.
One type of costs is the cost related to the government  bureaucracy  needed to administer
transfers -the enforcement  costs - or as Benson (1999) categorized them, as rent seeking and
rent avoidance.  There is also an important  dynamic cost - there is less incentive to invest when
property  rights are not secure  and a possibility exists for involuntary  income transfers. In
addition, redistribution  policy is often financed through discretionary  taxation, which is
associated with fiscal and macroeconomic  costs that need to be taken into account. These various
costs add up to the claim that the marginal  welfare costs of redistribution  can be characterized  by
an upward sloping curve, as shown in figure 2. At the same  time, building upon the idea of
redistribution  as insurance against the risk of financial market volatility, redistribution facilitates
financial openness with attendant economic efficiency gains and higher economic  growth and
welfare, which accompany  the process of financial market integration. Thus, there exists a
corresponding  marginal benefit for redistribution  that can be characterized  by a downward
sloping curve, as depicted in Figure 2. The point of intersection of these two marginal cost and
benefit curves determine the level of redistribution  that a country could optimally decide upon.
23 Focusing  on globalization  through trade, Rodrik (1997)  also emphasizes  the relationship  between  redistribution  and openness.








T1he  Role of International  Policy Coordination
International  policy coordination  in macroeconomic  policy and in financial regulation  and
supervision merits special attention. As generally  recognized,  macroeconomic  policy
coordination among major industrial countries has been instrumental  in reducing payment
imbalances, in stabilizing expectations  for currency and interest rate movements,  and in
lessening  the volatility of capital flows across their borders.  24 In the same vein, the coordination
of international  banking regulation in industrial  countries has been significant,  as exemplified  by
the Basel Capital Accord of 1992 and the subsequent  Core Principles for Effective Banking
Supervision.  With the memory of the  1980s debt crisis and its prolonged resolution  still alive, the
international  policy and regulatory responses  to the 1997-99 crises were prompt.  These
included  an easing of monetary policy in the major industrial countries;  extension of  large stand-
by and direct multilateral  and bilateral rescue loans; development  of internationally  agreed codes
and standards of good practice, transparency  and disclosure;  and establishment  of a plethora  of
high-level  committees with the aim of strengthening  the safety and soundness  of banks and other
financial firms involved  in international  capital flows. The international  financial assistance
committed from August  1997 to December  1998 to Thailand,  Korea, Indonesia,  Russia, and
Brazil amounted to $190 billion-1.4  times their foreign exchange reserves  and 30 percent of the
reserves of all developing countries at the end of 1997.25  The Miyazawa Plan, unveiled by the
Government of Japan in October 1997, committed US$ 30 billion in yen-denominated  assistance
24 See  Webb  (1995)  and  Bryant  and  Hodgkinson  (1989)  for a discussion  of international  polcy coordination  in rnacroeconornics,  and
Kapstein  (1989),  for  interational  coordination  of  banking  regulation.
25 See Dai[arni  (1998)  and  Eidhengreen  (1999)  for  firther  elaboration.
1  3loans to Asian countries affected by the crisis. Furthermore, the G7 finance ministers and central
bank governors endorsed in February 1999 the creation of a Financial Stability Forum to bring
together the monetary authorities from the G7, principal  regulatory agencies, and the
multilaterals,  and to serve as a focal point for assessing vulnerabilities  affecting the global
financial system, and identifying and overseeing  the required actions.
III. Cross-Country  Empirical Analysis
Our empirical investigation of the link between democracy  and financial openness, as
elaborated above, calls for reliable data on democracy,  financial openness, and measures of
redistribution  akin to income-insurance.  Such data is not readily available and needs to be
compiled  from various sources, including constructing indices for countries' openness to
international  capital flows and democracy.  Furthermore, in focusing on the role of redistribution
as income insurance, empirical measures of such concepts will not be easy, as data on public
expenditures  is not typically classified by their risk-reducing characteristics,  but by sectoral
coverage.26  In an effort to provide a proxy that would directly and effectively incorporate  the
risk-reducing  aspects of public expenditures, we interpret redistribution  as defined by the sum of
government  expenditures on health, education  and transfer payments, as a percentage of GDP
and averaged over the period from 1991-1997.
A. Financial  Openness to International  Capital Movements
Evidence  regarding the degree or level of openness of emerging market economies to cross-
border capital flows is scanty and fragmented. Informational  and methodological  problems have
hindered the proper development  of quantitative  measures of the degree of financial openness. In
contrast to measures of trade openness (or protection), for which a fair degree of consensus  exists
on both methodology  and systematic  data availability, research on measuring the degree of
countries' openness  to international finance remains in its infancy and requires attention. Most
studies in the past have relied on measures of incidence of capital controls, i.e., whether a
particular transaction  is subject to restrictions or not, rather than the degrees of intensity of such
restrictions and controls.27  In practice, controls can take a variety of forms ranging from direct
quantitative  limitations on certain transactions or associated transfers, to indirect measures - such
as withholding  taxes or reserves on external assets/liabilities,  which is intended to influence  the
economic  incentives  of engaging in certain transactions. Such controls could apply to the transfer
of funds associated with financial transactions, or the underlying transactions themselves. There
exists, of course, no single measure of a country's level of openness. Researchers  have relied on
a variety of proxies and indicators to assess the degree of openness  to capital flows. There are,
however, important  benchmarks, such as a country's assumption  of the IMF's Article VIII,
and/or currency convertibility  on capital accounts. A viable measure of a country's level of
financial openness  to international  capital markets needs to incorporate,  at the least, the
26 For  furiher discussion on this issue, see Devarajan and Hammer  (1998).
27 See, for instance, Razin and Rose  (1994), Alesina, GriDli  and MIesi-Ferretti  (1994).
14distinction between  the severity of controls and the different types of transactions contributing  to
capital flows. Table 1 provides preliminary information  on such a measure for a sample of 96
countries in 1997.
This measure referred to as the Financial Openness  Index is constructed using
disaggregated  measures of capital controls based on the classification  and information  contained
in the IMF Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AEAER),  and
draws on the coding methodology developed by Quinn and Toyoda (1997). The measure is a
composite index of our coding of rules, regulations, and administrative  procedures affecting
capital flows (both inflows and outflows) for a total of 27 individual  transactions in the current
and capital accounts of the balance of payments for each country in the sample. Thus out of 96
countries in the sample,  it is interesting  to note that 46 can be classified, as of 1997, as open and
10 as semi-open,  with both of these categories including emerging market economies in Latin
America and Eastern Europe.The Financial Openness  Index has a correlation of 0.51 with the
length of time that a country has accepted  the conditions of IMF's Article VIII. 28
28Correlation  is  calculated  between  the  Financial  Openness  Index  and  the  logarithm  of  the number  of years  since  a country  has
assumed  RMF's  Article  VIII.
15Table 1:
Financial Openness  Index: selected developed  and developing  countries, 1997
Open*  Largely Open*  Partially Closed*  Largely
Closed*
Argentina  1.78  Croatia  1.54  Bahamas,  The  1.36  Bangladesh  1.21
Australia  1.77  Ecuador  1.54  Belize  1.44  Barbados  1.28
Austria  1.92  Honduras  1.56  Benin  1.48  Bhutan  1.19
Bahrain  1.73  Israel  1.59  Botswana  1.48  Brazil  1.19
Belgium  1.88  Mongolia  1.56  Bulgaria  1.46  Ethiopia  1.12
Bolivia  1.79 Philippines  1.59  Burkina  Faso  1.49  India  1.20
Canada  1.92  Poland  1.54  Burundi  1.39  Malawi  1.26
Denmark  1.92  Slovak  Republic 1,58  Cameroon  1.41  Malaysia  1.34
Egypt,  Arab Rep.  1.81  Slovenia  1,50  Cape Verde  1.39  Morocco  1.27
El Salvador  1.91  Turkey  1.52  Chile  1.43  Pakistan  1.31
Estonia  1.88  China  1.37  Syrian Arab Rep 1.20
Finland  1.83  Colombia  1.38
France  1.73  Congo, Dem. Rep.  1.42
Germany  1.84  Costa Rica  1.48
Greece  1.91  Czech Republic  1.48
Guatemala  1.73  Dominican  Rep.  1.49
Guyana  1.72  Ghana  1.43
Iceland  1.74  Hungary  1.49
Ireland  1.93  Indonesia  1.46
Italy  1.84  Korea, Rep.  1.42
Jamaica  1.76  Lesotho  1.41
Japan  1.73  Mali  1.49
Kuwait  1.77  Malta  1.40
Latvia  1.88  Moldova  1.46
Lithuania  1.85  Mozambique  1.41
Luxembourg  1.93  Namibia  1.33
Mauritius  1.82  Papua New Guinea 1.36
Mexico  1.69  Romania  1.48
Netherlands  1.87  Russian Federation 1.43
New Zealand  1.90  South Africa  1.44
Nicaragua  1.82  Sri Lanka  1.43
Norway  1.83  Thailand  1.46
Panama  1.90  Tunisia  1.39
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(*)  Open: None or minimal  regulation  for outward and inward  transactions  together with a  generally
nondiscriminatory  environment.
Largely Open: Some regulations  are exercised  on outward  and inward  transactions  with the need of
documentary  support  but without  the need  of governmental  approval.
Partially Closed: Regulation  and govemmental  approval  is required  for outward  and inward  transactions
and  it is usually  granted.
Largely Closed: Substantial  restrictions  and governmental  approval  is required  and seldom  granted  for
outward  and  inward  transactions.
B. Democracy  Measure
Democracy  is, of course, a multi-dimensional  and poly-significant  concept, and difficult  to
measure empirically  in a uniform  way. Given the thrust of our analysis,  however, on the link
between democracy  and financial  openness, it is possible to rely on a comparative  notion of
democracy. This is based on the degree to which different countries meet the most commonly
accepted criteria of democratic order - i.e. the majority principle,  universal suffrage, civil rights
and political liberty. 29 Thus, our measure of democracy  follows the recent literature exploring  the
role of democracy  on economic  growth (Helliwell, 1992),  income levels (Londregan  and Poole,
1996),  and wages (Rodrick, 1999).  This measure defines democracy  as a composite index and
draws on the Freedom  House measures  of political and civil liberty; that is:
Democracy  _ 14 - civil rights - political  rights
Democracy  - ~12
This index  will be defined from 0 to 1, with 0 indicating  low democracy  and 1 indicating
high. Political and civil liberty indices are from the Comparative Survey of Freedom that
Freedom House  has provided on an annual basis since 1973. The Survey rates each country  on a
seven-point  scale for both political rights and civil liberties (1 representing the most free and 7
the least free).
The Survey assesses a country's  freedom by examining its record in these two areas: A
country grants its citizens political rights when it permits them to form political parties that
represent a significant  range of voter choice and whose leaders can openly compete for and be
elected to positions of power in government. A country upholds its citizens'  civil liberties when
29 See  Archibugil  (1998)  for  a discussion  of  various  premises  for  democracy.
17it respects and protects their religious, ethnic, economic, linguistic, and other rights, including
gender and family rights, personal freedoms,  and freedoms of the press, belief, and association.
The Survey divides  the world into three broad categories: "Free" (countries whose ratings
average 1-3); "Partly Free" (countries whose ratings average 3-5.5); and "Not Free" (countries
whose ratings average 5.5-7). {See Karatnycky,  Adrian (1999)}
Figure 3  Country Classification:  Political Rights and Financial  Openness
Financial Openness
Low  High
Low  ~  23  9 Low  (8.86)  (9.09)
Democracy
High  32  37 High  (18.24)  (25.59)
Drawing on the above measures of democracy and financial openness, Figure 3 provides a
2 by 2 classification of sample countries along the democracy and financial openness axis. The
figure shows the number of countries in each category, as well as the mean value for the
countries in each quadrant of average government expenditures  on health, education  and transfer
payments as a percentage of GDP for the period 1991-1997  (in parenthesis).  A high level
democracy  means democracy index > 0.6. A "High" level of financial openness is defined by a
score of >1.6 in the Financial  Openness Index. 30
From the matrix, it could be argued  that the difference  in means between the two groups
(High-Democracy & High Financial Openness group versus Low Democracy &-Low
Financial  Openness)  was highly significant at 0.1% level.
Table 2 reports the statistical summary  of the key variables classified by countries' degree
of openness. Of interest here is the wide difference  in countries' degree of redistribution  as
measured by the ratio of government social expenditure  to GDP. Thus, countries classified as
financially open spend on the average 22.3% of their GDP on social expenditures as compared to
6.7% among financially closed countries. Furthermore,  the view that financial openness,
democracy,  and government social spending go hand in hand is confirmed by the econometric
results shown in Figure 3. The cross-country data, with sample size ranging from 70 to 140,
shows statistically  significant  results for all three relationships  based on a z-test, with the highest
correlation  between political liberty and government social expenditures.
30 An.alternate  measure of openness of the economic nature is the Fraser Intitute's Economic Freedom of the World rankings.
These rankings  are strongly  correlated  with the Financial  Openness Index (0.70)  and show a correlation  of 0.49  with the Democracy
Index Thethe 95% confidence  interval forthe difference  inmeans is 11.15 21.74
18Table 2:  Taxonomy  of Financial Openness*
Country Grouping  by Financial Openness
(Open) (Largely Open)  (Largely Closed)  (Closed)
1  Democracy index'  0.81  0.71  0.63  0.48
2  Civil liberties 2 2.28  3.30  3.38  4.55
3  GDP  per capita 3 13,147  3,051  2,317  1,557
4  Social expenditure (%GDP) 4 22.3  23.5  12.5  6.7
5  Total government exp/GDP  (%)5  26.0  19.9  23.4  27.7
6  General government consumption  16.1  17.9  15.5  14.7
(% of GDP)6
Number of countries  46  10  34  11
* The table displays  the group averages  computed  for the countries  where  the data  were available.  Definition  of variables:  (1)
Democracy index  ranges from 0 (lowest)  to 1 (highest)  and is computed on the bases of pdkl  ria?s  and ci%d  Iirties indices (2) Ciad
likrties,  see footnote 13. (3) GDP/cap,  Gross Domestic Product per capita,  average  of 1990-97. (4) Social  e  t7r9  includes  the sum
of health, education,  and social  security and welfare;  average  1991-97. (5) Total  g  xwnD.mt  expeditkw,  average  of central government
and budgetary accounts plus state or  provindal  govermment,  1990-97.  (5) Geea  gow  eit  7  xnwnpti^  includes all current
expenditures  for purchases of goods and services  by all  levels  of government,  excluding  most government  enterprises.  It also includes
capital  expenditure  on national  defense and security,  1990-197.
Figure  4:  Relationships  among  Democracy,  Capital  mobility,  and
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19Note:  The  cross-country data,  with  sample  size' randing  from  70  to  140, shows
statistically significant  results at 1 % (except correlation  between transfers and finnacial
openness, which is siginificant at 5%) for all relationships based on a z-test, with the
highest correlation between democracy and government  social expenditures.
C. The Methodology
In examining  the significance  of redistribution  on the degree of financial openness  and
democracy  in countries,  we deploy the logit model (Amemiya, 1981)  to estimate the likelihood
that a given country  would fall in each of the four classifications  defined in Figure 3. For
expositional  measures  we focus first on the determinants  of the high-democracy  high-financial
openness classification  by using the binominal  logit model. In this model, the dependent  variable
is defined  by a dichotomous  random  variable y; which takes the value of 1 if country i belongs to
the high democracy  - high financial openness  category, and 0 if it does not. This is given  by
yi  =p,  +e,
where  p is the probability  that a given country belongs in the high democracy  - high financial
openness  category, and specified asp = F(ax); where  x is a vector of independent  variables;  and
a is the corresponding  vector of coefficients;  and F(ax) is the cumulative distribution function;
and es  is an error term assumed to follow the Bernoulli distribution.
Expressing the probability  for the i-th observation  via the logit model, we will obtain:
exp(a'x,)
'  +exp(a'x)
Subsequently,  the logit transformation  would yield:
log  Pi  = a'xi
'-pi
This model was estimated  by the maximum  likelihood  method, using cross-country  data
for a sample of 67 countries for which consistent data on all explanatory  variables was available.
The estimated  results, based on a (binomial)  logit model 3' of country  classifications  along  the
two axes of democracy  and financial  openness, are reported in Table 3. The results indicate that
31 We  obtained  the maximizing  likelihood  using  Neuton-Rapson  algorithm  We  used  the STATA  lo* procedure  after  5 iterations.
20both per capita  income and the ratio of social expenditures  to GDP have a statistically  significant
impact  in explaining  the likelihood  that a country  falls into the high-high  category. 32
The model also performs well in predicting  the percentage  of countries that are correctly
classified as belonging  to the high-democracy  high-financial  openness group, i.e. out of 27
countries in the High-High group, 19 were correctly  predicted  to be in that group (based on the
threshold  probability  of 0.5) , thus producing 70.37  percent  correct  classification  rate.
Table 3  Estimation  Result  of the Binomial  Logit Model:  the likelihood of countries
belonging to the high democracy level andfinancial openness category
Independent  variable  Coefficient  Z statistic  Marginal
effecta
Constant  -11.234**  -4.085  -2.022
Log of social expenditure  as % of GDP  1.534*  2.496  0.276
Log of GDP per capita  0.795*  2.496  0.143
Actual number  of countries in the target  28
group
Predicted number  of  countries in the target  20
groupb
Actual number of countries in other groups  39
Predicted number  of countries  in other  32
groups
Log likelihood  -27.744
Note:  The dependent  variable is coded 1 if the country  falls into the financial openness  - high
democracy,  and 0 otherwise.
significant  at 1%  level for a two-tailed  z-test
significant  at 5% level for a two-tailed  z-test
a marginal effect is marginal change in the probability  resulting from an infinitesimal  change in
the explanatory  variable
b target group means countries  with high level of political  rights and high financial openness
It is important  to note that our estimated  results are based on the logit model and the 2x2
country  classification  along the democracy  and financial openness indexes.  As with such
categorical  dependent  variable models,  the results may be sensitive  to the particular standard of
classification  adopted.
32 Using these estimates,  we can also estimate  the probabilities  of each country belonging  to the H:&Hig  group, as opposed to all
other  groups.  Given  thus  probabdity,  one  can classify  a country  to the group  that has  the predicted  probability  greater  or equal  than
0.5. This  classification  can  be compared  with  the actual  grouping  of the data,  and  the percentages  of correcty  predicted  countries  can
be computed  for  both  target  and  non-target  groups.
21We also used the multi-nominal  logit model to estimate  the likelihood  that a given country
would fit into each of the 2x2 classifications  (Figure 3). This is an extension of the binominal
logistic model, and can be specified as:
Pr(y~~ =1~x,)=p~'~  - exp(z  (j)
1  + exp(z  (2) ) + exp(z(3)  ) + exp(zj 4 f) )
zjJ  =aJx;,  j =2,3,4  i=l..n
where p,j)  = the probability  that the country i falls in the j  h  classification;
y's  are the set of binary response variables, y> =1  if the country i  belongs to the
group j  and yii  yy =0, otherwise
xi is the vector of explanatory  variables for the ith  country; and n is total number of
countries
Note that one of the k groups (here it is the first) has to be fixed as a reference group (or base
category). This means that the coefficients  of the corresponding  equation must be all set to zero,
so that we actually  estimate the set of k-I equations, which in the case or regular logit model
with 2 groups reduces to a single equation with coefficients  {ao,  a,, a2, ...am}. It can be easily
shown then, that exp(zjJ)) expresses  the probability  that the country i belongs to a group (j)
relative  to the probability  that it belongs to the reference  category (here the reference  category is
the Low-Low group), namely exp(zfj)) = Pr(y, = j) / Pr(yj =  1)  .33
The maximum  likelihood  associated  with the above multinominal  logit model is given as:
InL = (yi  ua(J)x; -In  es  ,under  the constraint  that  a') x  = 0
i=l  jsl  j=l
We estimate  the equation with the explanatory  variables defined  as: (i) per capita GDP,
and (ii) a log of the rate of social expenditures  to GDP, using the same cross-country  data as
33 APr1) is the marginal  change  in the probability Pr(y  -1)  -=  p  (j) resulting  from an infinitesimal  change in the I.th
explanatoiy  variable.
APr(l,  j) = a(j)  exp(zjj)  j = 2,3,4
(I  + exp(zi 2 ()  + exp(z( 3')) + exp(zi(4  ))2
The values  of z's are computed  at the mean values  of the explanatory  variables.
22before. The results are also satisfactory  with regard  to the low democracy  - low financial
openness  group,  but not conclusive with regard  to the other two intermediate  classifications.
Table 4: Multinomial  Logit Results
Financial  Openness (liigh),  Financial  Openness  (Low),  Financial  Openness (High),
Democracy  Democracv  hig  Democracy  (Lowl
Coefficie Marginal  z-statistic  Coefficients  Marginal  z-statistic  Coefficients  Marginal  z-statistic
nts  Effect  Effect  Effect
Log  of Socila  2.348**  0.148  2.664  1.739*  0.169  2.195  -0.523  -0.011  -0.538
Expenditure
per GDP
Log of  1.2091'  0.076  2.725  0.318  0.031  0.826  1.085*  0.022  2.241
GDP/capita
constant  -15.209'  -0.960  -4.186  -6.430*  -0.627  -2.406  -7.860*  -0.158  -2.358
significant at 5% level for a two-tailed z test
significant at 1% level for a two-tailed z test
The reference category is the Financil  Opevmss(Low)-denooaa(Loow)  group
Table 5: Prediction  Performance  of the Multinomial  Logit Model
Predicted  dependent  Variable  Total  Percent
Correct
Actual  dependent  variable  0  1  2  3
0  Financial  Openness  (Low),  13  2  0  2  17  0.765
Democracy  (Low)
1  Financial  Openness  (Low),  5  3  1  6  15  0.200
Democracy  (High)
2  Financial  Openness  (High),  4  0  1  2  8  0.143
Democracy  (Low)
3  Financial  Openness  (High),  1  2  0  25  28  0.893
Democracy  (High)  II
Total  23  7  2  35  67  0.627
It can be seen that the multinomial logit provided a satisfactory prediction of the two extreme groups (lowlow
and bhhg)  while underpredicting the other two groups.
23IV. Conclusion
The relationship  between financial  openness and democracy  appears  at first sight to be
primarily  a function of the level of income. Rich countries are open to international  capital
movement,  as they have a high degree of financial  sector development,  currency  convertibility
on capital accounts, and enjoy macroeconomic  stability,  domestic rule of law, and stable
institutions  that guarantee  civil and political liberty. At a deeper level of analysis, however, the
link between  democracy  and financial  openness  proves to be more complex.  This paper discusses
the factors linking financial openness  and democracy  both through a narrative of historical
experience  as well as cross-country empirical investigation.  The narrative section focuses on
international  policy coordination,  redistributive  policies, and the embedded  liberalism of the
Bretton Woods era, which contributed  to the survival  of democracy  in the face of the challenges
posed by fascism  and commnunism.  The Bretton Woods consensus  on postwar institutional
reconstruction  combined multilateralism  in trade and related exchange rate arrangements  on the
external  side, with interventionism  in pursuit of legitimate  national goals (full employment,
national  security, and social stability)  on the domestic side. As history attests, this policy mix
proved highly successful.
The underlying  conditions,  trends, and forces at play in global financial  markets have
changed considerably  since 1944. Financial  markets have grown  significantly  in the size,
complexity,  and range of the services and products they offer. Private capital  now dominates
development  finance, surpassing  official flows by 5 to 1 in recent years. And the spread of
democracy  and civil liberty means that for the first time in human history, electoral democracy  is
the world's predominant  form of government.  The consolidation  of the move towards
democratic governance,  in turn, means increased demand by citizens for political voice, for
national economic  security,  and for social insurance against  heightened  exposure to international
financial volatility. Then, if, as in OECD countries,  the potential gains from openness  to cross-
border capital flows are to be realized in developing countries,  there will need to be an
understanding  and appreciation  of the interrelationships  between  domestic politics and a
country's openness  to international  finance. On the international  front, since  capital account
liberalization  brings welfare gains globally, there is a justification for international  action -
policy coordination,  prudent financial  regulation  and supervision,  and lender-of-last-resort
activity to provide  liquidity and emergency  financial  assistance.
For developing  countries undergoing  democratization  in a world where the Bretton Woods
system of fixed exchange  rates has given way to the challenges  posed by an evolving  global
economy subject  to the tenets of neo-liberalism,  their integration  into global international  capital
markets has proved to be a process fraught  with risk and painful cycles of currency, financial,
and sovereign  debt crisis. Yet, instead of rolling back liberalization  in the face of uncertainties,
historic experience  points to the benefits of taking complementary  action. This paper has argued
for the importance  of two sets of actions: (i) greater coordination  of macroeconomic  and
regulatory  policies at the international  level; and (ii) cost-effective  redistributive  schemes  as
insurance against  the risks of financial  instability at the domestic level.
The move  toward democracy  worldwide should  facilitate greater policy coordination,  as
democratic  systems  foster a greater degree of regime stability,  policy credibility,  and security of
24property  rights than authoritarian  ones. At the same time, the consolidation  of the move towards
democratic governance,  in turn, means increased demand  by citizens for political voice, for
national economic  security, and for social insurance against heightened  exposure  to international
financial volatility. Among OECD countries,  capital mobility as a policy objective gained
currency and support  only after significant  trade liberalization  had taken place, and only in the
context of democratic countries  in which the state's ability to respond to citizen's demands  for
national  economic security had been established.  This system  must be recreated on a global
level, and the experience of OECD countries must be taken into account when considering  the
status of developing  countries moving  toward democratization  and full capital account
convertibility  in today's international  financial environment.
This paper  presented information  suggesting  that there is a positive and statistically
significant  correlation between democracy,  open capital flows and redistributive domestic social
policies. This correlation,  notwithstanding  some data limitation,  is significant in unveiling the
positive forces at work in generating  the convergent trends towards greater democracy  and
financial openness,  as well as the critical role of redistribution-confirmed also by the more
rigorous multinomial  logit model. Further research clearly  needs to move from the analysis  of
correlations  to reflect on the causalities  involved in the nexus of market openness,  democracy,
and redistributive  policies. The thrust of the analytical  framework  sketched in this paper is that
countries  choose their degree of openness  to international  finance in order to maximize social
welfare while safeguarding  against the risks of capital flow volatility. Democratic  governance
plays an important  role in framing the specifics of the social welfare  function in a manner that is
consistent  with citizens' desire for redistribution  and their degree of risk aversion. 34
34This  analytical  framework  is described  more  fully  in an  upconiing  paper.
25ANNEX
Date that selected  IMF member countries  have assumed  Article  VIII
El Salvador  11/06/46  Indonesia  05/07/88
Mexico  11/12/46  Portugal  09/12/88
Panama  11/26/46  Republic  of Korea  11/01/88
United  States  12/10/46
Turkey  03/22/90
Honduras  07/01/50  Thailand  05/04/90
Canada  03/25/52  Switzerland  05/29/92
Dominican  Republic  08/01/53  Greece  07/22/92
Tunisia  01/06/93
Belgium  02/15/61  Morocco  01/21/93
France  02/15/61  Israel  09/21/93
Germany  02/15/61  Mauritius  09/29/93
Ireland  02/15/61  Barbados  11/03/93
Luxembourg  02/15/61  Trinidad  and  Tobago  12/13/93
Netherlands  02/15/61  Ghana  02/02/94
Sweden  02/15/61  Sri Lanka  03/15/94
Italy  02/15/61  Bangladesh  04/11/94
United  Kingdom  02/15/61  Lithuania  05/03/94
Austria  08/01/62  Latvia  06/10/94
Jamaica  02/22/63  Pakistan  07/01/94
Kuwait  04/05/63  Estonia  08/15/94
Japan  04/01/64  India  08/20/94
Nicaragua  07/30/64  Paraguay  08/23/94
Costa  Rica  02/01/65  Malta  11/30/94
Australia  07/01/65  Croatia  05/29/95
Guyana  12/27/66  Poland  06/01/95
Denmark  05/01/67  Moldova  06/30/95
Norway  05/11/67  Slovenia  09/01/95
Bolivia  06/05167  Philippines  09/08/95
Argentina  05/14/68  Czech  Republic  10/01/95
Singapore  11/09/68  Slovak  Republic  10/01/95
Malaysia  11/11/68  Botswana  11/17/95
Malawi  12/07/95
Ecuador  08/31/70  Hungary  01/01/96
Bahrain  03/20/73  Mongolia  02/01/96
South  Africa  09/15/73  Benin  06/01/96
The  Bahamas  12/05/73  Burkina  Faso  06/01/96
Papua  New  Guinea  12/04/75  Cameroon  06/01/96
Venezuela  07/01/76  Mali  06/01/96
Chile  07/27/77  Russian  Federation  06/01/96
Namibia  09/20/96
Uruguay  05/02/80  Romania  03/25/98
New  Zealand  08/05/82  FYR  Macedonia  06/19/98
Belize  06/14/83  Bulgaria  09/24/00
Iceland  09/19/83  Rwanda  12/10/98
Spain  07/15/86
Source: Exchange  Arrangements  and  Exchange  Restrictions,  Annual  Report  1999
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